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I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the notion that the eighth amendment' is confined
strictly to criminal cases, the excessive fines clause of the eighth
amendment should apply to the imposition of punitive damages
and all judicially imposed monetary sanctions in civil cases. Al-
though this view represents a sharp departure from accepted doc-
trine, this interpretation of the excessive fines clause is consistent
with the historical development of the textual antecedents of the
eighth amendment, s the political theory that underlies the adop-
tion of the eighth amendment,4 and the contemporary purposes
served by punitive damages themselves.5 Moreover, this view in no
way violates the holdings of those cases which have articulated the
doctrine that the eighth amendment applies only to criminal
sanctions.'
Section II of this Article summarizes the eighth amendment
case law which has spawned the notion that the amendment has no
applicability beyond criminal cases. Section III examines in detail
the historical evolution of the excessive fines clause and the legal
practices to which it and its antecedents were intended to respond.
Finally, Section IV tests the congruence of this Article's thesis with
both the political theory that the eighth amendment reflects and
the ends sought to be achieved by punitive damages in civil
actions.
II. APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ONLY TO CRIMINAL
CASES: A DOCTRINE FASHIONED FROM DICTA
The notion that the eighth amendment applies only to crimi-
nal proceedings is derived from litigation that considered whether
a given punishment could be termed "cruel and unusual." In
reaching a generalized conclusion about the applicability of the en-
tire eighth amendment, the Supreme Court has treated the amend-
ment as a single concept by assuming implicitly that the scope of
each of the amendment's three guarantees is and was intended to
be identical. This rigid view also assumes that the historical
sources of eighth amendment guarantees are identical, when, in
1. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 7-40.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 41-210.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 216-33.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 211-15.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 7-25.
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fact, each of the amendment's clauses has a distinct historical
origin.
As recently as 1977, the Supreme Court in Ingraham v.
Wright1 firmly restated its view that the entire eighth amendment
applies only to criminal proceedings. Ingraham, however, dealt
with the relatively narrow question of whether corporal punish-
ment inflicted in the Florida public school system was a cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
In holding, by a scant five to four majority, that the amendment
had no applicability to discipline administered in the Florida pub-
lic schools, the Court decided only that paddlings and whippings
(concededly nonfinancial punishments) outside of the criminal pro-
cess were beyond the scope of the punishments clause of the eighth
amendment.8 However questionable this conclusion may be,9 it in
no way disposes of a contention that the prohibition of excessive
fines is broader in scope than the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. In order to support its conclusion that the entire
subject matter of the amendment was intended to focus upon the
criminal process, the Ingraham Court relied on a reading of histor-
ical sources detailing the perceived intentions of the eighth amend-
ment's proponents. 10 The clear implication, of course, is that the
excessive fines clause is limited to criminal proceedings. This con-
clusion, however, is too contrived because the historical sources
that the Ingraham Court considered are much too superficial upon
which to hang so weighty and definitive a pronouncement.11
The Ingraham Court did not write on a blank slate. Although
the eighth amendment did not produce much litigation during the
nineteenth century,1 2 by 1910 the Supreme Court had begun to
7. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
8. Id. at 664.
9. See generally id. at 683-700 (White, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 664-66 (majority opinion). But see infra text accompanying notes 41-57.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 41-210.
12. The accepted wisdom of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that the
"cruel and unusual" punishments clause prohibited only barbarous punishments, such as
the rack and other instruments of torture. For example, the objection raised in the Massa-
chusetts ratification convention stated:
[Congressional legislators] are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and
unheard-of punishments and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional
check of them, but that racks and gibbets may be among the most mild instruments of
their discipline.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 111 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1968) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter J. ELLIOT]. Because
the rack and similar atrocities were not often employed in the first century of the Nation,
the punishments clause rarely was invoked. Accordingly, some contemporary commentators
12351987]
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formulate the modern doctrine that punishments disproportionate
to the offense offend the cruel and unusual punishments clause.13
Weems v. United States14 involved an appeal from a Philippine
territorial court of a fifteen-year sentence at hard labor in chains 15
for an apparently inadvertent false entry in a government payroll
book.16 Four Justices of a seven member Supreme Court held that
this punishment was cruel and unusual because it was sufficiently
disproportionate to the offense. 17
The Weems principle of proportionality has been applied with
some regularity. In Robinson v. California"s the Court held that a
ninety-day sentence constituted a disproportionate penalty for the
crime of being a drug addict. 9 In Coker v. Georgia20 the Court
held that ordinarily the death penalty "is grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape."' The Court also
concluded in Enmund v. Florida22 that the death penalty was ex-
cessive and disproportionate for felony murder when imposed on a
thought the clause was obsolete. See, e.g., 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 694 (8th ed. 1927). See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
13. The first stirrings of this doctrine appear in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
(1892), in which the defendant, a licensed New York liquor dealer, had been sentenced to 54
years in prison after failing to pay a $6638.72 fine imposed upon conviction of 307 separate
counts of illegal mail order sales of alcoholic beverages to Vermont residents. The majority
of the Supreme Court never ruled upon O'Neil's contention that the sentence was so dispro-
portionate to the crime that it was barred by the punishments clause of the eighth amend-
ment because O'Neil had failed to brief the point, id. at 331, and the amendment "does not
apply to the States." Id. at 332. Mr. Justice Field dissented, contending that the eighth
amendment "is directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. at 339-40 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
14. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
15. The sentence was actually to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a "bizarre penalty
. . . unknown to Anglo-Saxon law [which]... entailed.., imprisonment chained day and
night at the wrists and ankles, hard and painful labor while so chained, and a number of
'accessories' including lifetime civil disabilities." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 306-07 (1983)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Weems).
16. Weems, 217 U.S. at 363.
17. The Court adopted the principle of proportionality as a constitutional standard,
id. at 372-73, after having noted that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Id. at 367.
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
19. Id. at 667.
20. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 592.
22. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). But see Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987) (holding that
death penalty not excessive and disproportionate when applied to major participant in fel-
ony murder recklessly indifferent to homicide).
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defendant who neither had killed, attempted to kill, nor intended
that killing occur or lethal force be employed in the commission of
a crime. Most recently, the Court held in Solem v. Helm23 that life
imprisonment without possibility of parole was excessive and dis-
proportionate when imposed on an "habitual offender" convicted
of writing a 100 dollar check on a fictional bank account and whose
prior offenses were "relatively minor. ' 24 The Solem Court observed
that the Supreme Court "has continued to recognize that the
Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punish-
ments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on the proscrip-
tion. '25 But, of course, all of these cases except Ingraham involved
consideration of a plainly criminal punishment. None of the cases
dealt with either the question of excessiveness of a criminal fine or
other types of fines to which the eighth amendment prohibition
may apply.
More interesting, from the perspective of this Article, are
those cases that required consideration of penalties imposed
outside the criminal process but, it was argued, were prohibited by
the eighth amendment. Thus, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States26
the Court held that the eighth amendment did not apply to the
deportation of aliens on the ground that "deportation is not a pun-
ishment for crime. '27 To similar effect is Bugajewitz v. Adams, 28 in
which Justice Holmes curtly characterized deportation as not "a
punishment," but rather "a refusal by the Government to harbor
persons whom it does not want. '29 Both cases are cited approvingly
in Ingraham,30 and this highly artificial and compartmentalized
notion of penalty continues to survive in American immigration
law. 31
23. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
24. Id. at 303. The defendant's prior offenses included three burglary convictions, one
grand larceny conviction, one drunk driving conviction, and one conviction for obtaining
money under false pretenses. Id. at 279-80.
25. Id. at 288 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976)). Even Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), which upheld Texas' mandatory life imprisonment statute for
three-time felons on a factual pattern similar to Solem, acknowledges that some prison
sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate. Id. at 274 n.11.
26. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
27. Id. at 730.
28. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
29. Id. at 591.
30. See 430 U.S. 651, 668 (1977).
31. See Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25, 66
(1984).
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In Trop v. Dulles,32 however, the Court concluded that statu-
tory deprivation of the "rights of citizenship,"33 by reason of dis-
honorable discharge from the armed services, was a cruel and un-
usual punishment. Although the Trop Court assumed that the
eighth amendment applied only to punishments penal in nature, 4
a plurality adopted a purposive approach to that inquiry:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its
determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disa-
bility for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer,
to deter others, etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accom-
plish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
3 5
The Trop purposive approach was wholly ignored in Ingra-
ham; instead, Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, seem-
ingly read Trop as a criminal punishment case by linking the expa-
triation to a prior military conviction for desertion. 6 Yet, the
Ingraham Court did concede the possibility that "[s]ome punish-
ments, though not labeled 'criminal' by the State, may be suffi-
ciently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in
which they are administered to justify application of the Eighth
Amendment. 3 7 The Ingraham Court, apparently, did not think
that Trop's loss of citizenship rights resulting from his dishonora-
ble discharge was analogous to criminal punishment. Nor, of
course, was corporal punishment in the Florida public schools.
For purposes of this inquiry, however, it is important to note
that general pronouncements about the applicability of the eighth
amendment have been made in the context of the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause. Even viewed from the punishment per-
spective, however, there seems to be some doctrinal disharmony
about the exclusively criminal application of the eighth amend-
32. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
33. Nationality Act of 1940, § 401(g), 54 Stat. 1168, 1169 (1940), amended by 58 Stat.
4 (1944) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1982)).
34. 356 U.S. at 99-100.
35. Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
36. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667.
37. Id. at 669 n.37. The Ingraham majority also chose to neglect the holding of Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in which a prison official's deliberate indifference to prison-
ers' medical needs was deemed a form of cruel and unusual punishment. Only the most
cynical observer would conclude that such official misconduct is part of the punishment
inflicted for committing a crime. 430 U.S. at 669; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (conclud-
ing that due process was violated by a state's forced commitment of a 15-year-old boy as a
juvenile delinquent without notice or service of any charges, taking of any sworn testimony,
opportunity of confronting accusers, or preservation of a record).
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ment. Ingraham appears to stand for the inflexible proposition
that the eighth amendment is properly applied only to avowed and
express criminal proceedings. Yet, the opinion recognized the pos-
sibility that what is labeled civil may be treated as criminal for
purposes of the eighth amendment. This escape hatch-from what
otherwise would be suffocatingly mechanical jurisprudence-is am-
ply supported by Trop, which focuses on the apparent purpose of
the punishment in question as the rationale for distinguishing be-
tween punishments that must be tested for eighth amendment
compliance and those that escape such constitutional review
altogether.38
Regardless of whether one accepts the Trop purposive ap-
proach, the facial rigidity of Ingraham, or Ingraham diluted by a
dose of Trop, one is left with the conclusion that there must be a
penal aspect to the contested sanction to merit eighth amendment
scrutiny. This conclusion is based on a reading of history, accord-
ing to Ingraham,39 and is the product of litigation concerning some
form of nonfinancial punishment. Ingraham, Trop, and their pred-
ecessors do not deal with excessive fines, but rather with cruel and
unusual punishments. Relying on historical sources concerning
only the punishment aspect of the eighth amendment to determine
whether the amendment applies to excessive fines is to use history
in a misleading fashion and to indulge in an interpretational ethic
that is textually warped. The analytic exercise displayed by Ingra-
ham, when applied to the excessive fines clause, fails to acknowl-
edge the possibility that the excessive fines clause has a history
independent of the bail and punishments clauses. Moreover, to
reach definitive conclusions about the scope of the excessive fines
clause while considering and deciding cases challenging a given
punishment as cruel and unusual is to ignore the separate text of
the excessive fines clause and to fail to consider the differing con-
text in which an excessive fines claim may arise. 0 The Court's gen-
38. See supra text accompanying note 35.
39. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-65.
40. While the focus of this Article is primarily upon the historical developments lead-
ing to inclusion of the excessive fines clause in the United States Constitution, I do not
contend that history is the sole legitimate determinant of constitutional meaning. Nor do I
accept the notion that constitutional interpretation is bounded by the text itself, a position
labeled "textualist" by Professor Thomas Grey. See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (stating that "textualists" are "those who consider the text the sole
legitimate source of operative norms in constitutional adjudication"). On the other hand, I
reject noninterpretivism, a label for the notion that anything may be used to supplement
constitutional text. See Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
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eral statements in Ingraham are, in short, mere dicta and not
binding on a later court's consideration of the scope of the exces-
sive fines clause. For these reasons, it is important to examine crit-
ically the historical evolution of the excessive fines clause, with a
particular focus upon the practices the excessive fines clause and
its antecedents in Anglo-American law sought to limit.
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES
CLAUSE
A fresh look at the historical evolution of the excessive fines
clause should cause the contemporary examiner to reconsider pre-
cisely what was meant by its inclusion in the eighth amendment.
The immediate history of the eighth amendment is well known.
The text was taken, almost verbatim, from a provision of the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights of 1776,41 which was identical to a pro-
vision in the 1689 Bill of Rights.42 Prior to its incorporation in the
Constitution as the eighth amendment, eight other states adopted
703 (1975). Grey's definitions seem to have shifted slightly, as he now replaces "noninterpre-
tivist" with "supplementer," to denote "those who accept supplementary sources of consti-
tutional law." Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, supra, at 1. In this parlance, I am a
supplementer, primarily with respect to historical sources.
The interpretative ethic I employ begins with text, first inspecting the ordinary usage of
the terms. Next, I reason by analogy from "core cases to their close substitutes ... [and
proceed to] exceptions to a general prohibition that must be accepted as a necessary impli-
cation from the text, given the theory which renders intelligible its central commands." Ep-
stein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253, 264-65 (1986). Meaning
that can be derived from the structure and relationship of terms, limits, and rights in the
text is also legitimate. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1969). Finally, I believe that the text can not fully be understood without an
appreciation of the historical context in which it was written. This context may assume
multiple forms, including political, social, and intellectual, but definitely includes directly
relevant legal history. It is that latter inquiry that provides the focus of this Article. By
itself, however, history is unable to answer the questions raised by constitutional interpreta-
tion. See Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987).
41. The Virginia Convention of 1776 was convened to consider whether Virginia ought
unilaterally to declare itself independent from Britain. The convention promptly resolved
both to instruct its delegates to the Continental Congress to propose a declaration of inde-
pendence of all the colonies and prepare a declaration of rights in order to "secure substan-
tial and equal liberty to the people" of Virginia. Resolution of Virginia Convention of 1776,
quoted in H. GRIGSBY, THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1776, at 18 (1855). Section 9 of the
Declaration of Rights adopted by the Virginia convention read: "That excessive bail ought
not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 288 (R. Rutland ed. 1970).
42. 1 W. & M., 2d sess., ch. 2 (1689). The Bill of Rights provision is identical to article
10 of the English Declaration of Rights, reprinted in L. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, 1689, at 297 (1981).
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the clause,43 and the federal government placed it in the 1787
Northwest Ordinance."
There was little debate over the excessive fines clause in the
First Congress.4 5 What little debate there was occurred in a pecu-
liar context, which suggests an uncritical attitude by the congres-
sional authors toward the excessive fines clause. The debate over
the excessive fines clause immediately followed congressional con-
sideration of the fifth amendment.46 In considering the self-incrim-
ination clause of that amendment, the House discussed whether
the guarantee could or should apply outside of criminal proceed-
ings. After deliberation of this issue, the House adopted an amend-
ment that specifically confined the benefits of the clause "to crimi-
nal cases."' 7 Only then did Congress turn its attention to the
proposed eighth amendment. If it had been the framers' specific
intent to confine the excessive fines clause (or, for that matter, the
entire eighth amendment) to criminal actions, a similar amend-
ment would seem to have been the obvious solution. The fact that
none was proposed may suggest the lack of any such intent.48 Or, it
simply may suggest that Congress thought the eighth amendment's
guarantees so clearly applied only to criminal prosecutions that no
clarifying amendment was needed.4'9 Far too much meaning can be
read into the congressional silence; a more likely, and mundane,
reading is that Congress uncritically accepted the language, treat-
ing it as a shorthand expression for ancient rights rooted in the soil
of English law. For, as Leonard Levy has observed, in connection
with colonial declarations of rights:
The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and constitu-
tions simply does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a dili-
gent or systematic one. Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were
imitative, deficient, and irrationally selective. In the glorious act of framing a
social compact expressive of the supreme law, Americans tended simply to
draw up a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy their urge for a
statement of first principles-or for some of them. That task was executed in
43. See Granucci, supra note 12, at 840.
44. 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 28, § 14, art. II (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds.
1987).
45. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1789).
46. Id. at 781-82.
47. Id. at 782.
48. See, e.g., L. TmBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHoIcEs 29-44 (1985). But see Powell, supra
note 40, at 671-72.
49. With respect to the cruel and unusual punishments clause, this might very well be
the case. Objections to the clause were voiced in the First Congress on the grounds that the
clause might prohibit common criminal punishments such as whipping and earcropping. 1
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 782-83.
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a disordered fashion that verged on ineptness."
At least with respect to the excessive fines clause, Levy's char-
acterization has an apt flavor. The congressional debates reflect an
uncritical acceptance of the clause, which was first formulated in
an American bill of rights in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of
Rights.51 The best evidence is that the draftsman of the Virginia
declaration, George Mason, a planter without formal legal training
but well-versed in English constitutional history, simply adopted
wholesale the 1689 English Bill of Rights when he drafted Vir-
ginia's version in 1776.52
George Mason's views were unequivocal. Mason was on record
as early as 1766 that American colonials "claim Nothing but the
Liberty & Privileges of Englishmen, in the same degree, as if we
had still continued among our Brethren in Great Britain. ' 53 By
1774, in the Fairfax County Resolves, Mason reiterated that colo-
nists were entitled to all the "Privileges, Immunities and Advan-
tages" of English constitutional and common law.5 4 Mason's intent
in drafting the Virginia Declaration of Rights is equally unmistak-
able: "We have received [the ancient constitutional and common-
law rights of Englishmen] from our Ancestors, and, with God's
Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to our Posterity. '55
Even if Mason's catalogue of rights was derivative, it had a
symbolic importance that was, perhaps, larger than the text. Dur-
ing the Virginia ratification debates, Patrick Henry declared that
the Virginia Declaration of Rights "secures the great and principal
rights of mankind," such "rights of the people" being those se-
cured by English and American statutory law, English constitu-
50. L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION 411 (1968).
51. See supra note 41. However, as early as 1682, Pennsylvania guaranteed its citizens
"[t]hat all fines shall be moderate, and saving men's contenements, merchandize, or
wainage." Pennsylvania Frame of Government § XVIII, reprinted in 1 THE ROOTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 141 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971). The provision is plainly derived from the Magna
Charta's Chapter 14, which limited amercements, yet is phrased in terms of fines only. See
infra notes 108 & 153-54. Thus, at least some colonial Americans regarded fines and amerce-
ments as functional equivalents. The Pennsylvania provision predated the English Bill of
Rights by seven years, perhaps indicating both that Americans were especially quick to re-
state the old guarantees of the Magna Charta in a modern, broad form and that the Ameri-
can predisposition was to conclude that the excessive fines clause of the English Bill of
Rights operated to limit amercements as well as fines.
52. See H. GRIGSBY, supra note 41, at 155-66; Granucci, supra note 12, at 840.
53. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 41, at 65, 71 (reprinting letter of
June 6, 1766, to "the Committee of Merchants in London").
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 71.
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tional law, and the common law of England, especially as imported
to America.58 Henry's views were not atypical; revolutionary
America was peppered with assertions that colonial Americans pos-
sessed all the ancient rights and liberties of Englishmen. 57 Part of
the revolutionary animus was the perceived need to preserve invio-
late those ancient liberties. It should not be regarded as novel,
therefore, to conclude that the revolutionary charters and their im-
mediate progeny-particularly the Bill of Rights-were intended,
in part, as restatements of long-established English constitutional
and common-law liberties.
Since the lineage of the excessive fines clause is so obviously
and directly traceable to the 1689 English Declaration of Rights
and its statutory counterpart, the Bill of Rights, it is vital to ex-
amine the sources of that great declaration in order to understand
fully what political aspirations, ideas, and ancient liberties the ex-
cessive fines clause was intended to encapsulate.
A. The English Declaration of Rights of 1689
No understanding of the English Declaration of Rights can be
complete without some appreciation of its context: in particular,
the almost bloodless Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, which
culminated in the flight of James II to France and the accession to
the throne of William of Orange and his wife Mary, a daughter of
James by his first marriage. Following James' flight, a parliamen-
tary convention was elected, which drafted the Declaration of
56. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 12, at 461, 513, 587-88.
57. Mason and Henry were not alone. The 1774 Continental Congress declared for all
the colonists that "we claim all the benefits secured to the subject by the English constitu-
tion." 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 83 (W. Ford ed. 1904), quoted in Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983). To similar effect were the Georgia Resolutions of 1774 that
colonists were "entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-
subjects in Great Britain." 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 700 (4th series 1837) (emphasis in origi-
nal), quoted in Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.
Historians generally have agreed that the Virginia Declaration "was a restatement of
English principles-the principles of Magna Charta. . . and the Revolution of 1688," out of
which came the 1689 English Bill of Rights. A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND
AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 146 (1924), quoted in Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86 n.10;
see also A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 205-07 (1968); cf. D. LovJoy, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1972). This
view has been accepted by the United States Supreme Court:
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the
scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights
is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same protec-
tion-including the right to be free from excessive punishments.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.
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Rights and offered the crown to William and Mary. Upon his ac-
ceptance, William acknowledged the validity of the rights stated in
the Declaration." Parliament then enacted the Declaration into
law, in almost identical form, as the Bill of Rights.5 9 The Declara-
tion and Bill of Rights are the lasting work of this nonviolent
revolution that altered forever the'terms by which democracy and
monarchy coexisted in England. By forcing the abdication of one
king, setting forth new limits on royal authority, restating old lim-
its, establishing the correlative rights of the citizenry, and ob-
taining royal assent to the validity of these principles, the actors of
the Glorious Revolution did more than substitute a new king for
an old one; they created a new kingship, diminished in power and
expressly observant of the rights of Englishmen.
James II, a devout Catholic, succeeded his brother Charles II
to the throne in February 1685,0 much to the distaste of the
Whigs"' and their preferred successor, the exiled Duke of Mon-
mouth, Charles' illegitimate son. Monmouth, a fervent Anglican,
immediately challenged James with a small, armed invasion from
Holland. The rebellion, however, was easily crushed; Monmouth
was executed, and his followers were cruelly dealt with.2
58. William's brief and gracious speech, accepting the crown and acknowledging the
Declaration, follows:
This is certainly the greatest proofe of the trust you have in us that can bee given,
which is the thing that maketh us value it the more, and wee thankfully accept what
you have offered. And as I had no other intention in coming hither than to preserve
your Religion, Lawes and Liberties, so you may bee sure that I shall endeavour to
support them and shall bee willing to concurre in any thing that shall bee for the good
of the kingdome and to do all that is in my power to advance the welfare and Glory of
the Nation.
See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 259 (reprinting photograph of actual written speech).
It is interesting to observe that William uses "we" in accepting the crown on Mary's and his
behalf but immediately switches to "I" when discussing future royal administration. Royal
authority was joint in name alone.
59. 1 W. & M., 2d sess., ch. 2 (1689).
60. All dates concerning the Glorious Revolution are given in Old Style, then in use in
England, but with the year beginning on January 1. The Old Style calendar was 10 days
behind New Style dating.
61. During the "Exclusion Crisis" of 1676-83, the Whigs made a valiant effort to enact
legislation that would bar James, then Duke of York, from succeeding his brother, Charles
II, to the throne. James' Catholicism was a principal (but not the only) reason for this antip-
athy. See generally J. JONES, THE FIRST WHIGS: THE POLITICS OF THE EXCLUSION CRISIS,
1678-1683 (1961).
62. Monmouth's invasion force landed in the west of England in June 1685. The upris-
ing caused the cancellation of the autumn assizes in the west country, but James compen-
sated by appointing Lord Jeffreys, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, to assume circuit re-
sponsibilities for the trial of Monmouth's adherents. See G. KEETON, LORD CHANCELLOR
JEFFREYS AND THE STUART CAUSE 301, 306 (1965); see also 4 J. CAMPBELL, LORD CHANCELLORS
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James' brief and tempestuous reign otherwise was marked by
bitter hostility toward his policies, particularly the exercise of a
claimed royal power to suspend or dispense with parliamentary
laws, which was utilized by James to enforce official toleration for
Catholics and Dissenters.13 These efforts directly and severely
oF ENGLAND 340 (J. Mallory ed. 1874). Lord Jeffreys began his task in August 1685 with the
trial of Lady Alice Lisle, an elderly widow, on a charge of harboring rebels. G. KEETON,
supra, at 301-31; see also 4 J. CAMPBELL, supra, at 341-43. Lady Lisle was promptly con-
victed and sentenced to be burned at the stake, but James commuted her sentence to be-
heading. 4 J. CAMPBELL, supra, at 343.
Once Jeffreys realized that the sheer volume of prosecutions would make the swift dis-
position of Monmouth's rebels impossible, he resorted to plea bargaining. He offered to
forego imposition of the particularly grisly death penalty for treason (drawing, hanging until
not quite dead, disembowelment, beheading and quartering) in exchange for guilty pleas
and transportation into penal servitude in the West Indies. See Granucci, supra note 12, at
854; see also L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 97. The offer was not indicative of either
judicial efficiency or mercy, for treason law provided that all property of a traitor was for-
feited to the crown. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *381.
Although prohibited by statute, see 8 Hen. 6, chs. 16, 18 (1423), and condemned by com-
mentators, see, e.g., 2 E. COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *48, a sordid prac-
tice had developed by which the crown granted to its favored courtiers the rights to such
forfeited property. The grantee then solicited forfeiture prior to conviction. L. SCHWOERER,
supra note 42, at 96-97. As a result of the bargain offered, Jeffreys estimated each rebel was
worth 10 to 15 pounds, which represented the profit to be made by selling the unfortunate
accuseds into penal servitude. 4 J. CAMPBELL, supra, at 347-48; G. KEETON, supra, at 325.
Moreover, Jeffreys was personally corrupt; he sold a pardon to Edward Prideaux, a wealthy
Whig, for 14,500 pounds, paid directly to Jeffreys. G. KEETON, supra, at 326; cf. 4 J. CAMP-
BELL, supra, at 347-48. Finally, Jeffreys reneged on his plea bargains and signed death war-
rants for some 200 rebels who had pled guilty in response to Jeffreys' offer. See Granucci,
supra note 12, at 854. All were executed that winter and their property confiscated. Id.; see
aLso 1 T. MACAULAY. HISTORY OF ENGLAND 583-87 (Belford, Clarke ed. n.d.) (describing the
thoroughness of the confiscation). Little wonder this exercise became known as the "Bloody
Assizes."
63. The suspending power was the power to set aside the operation of a law for a
period of time, but not to repeal it altogether. The dispensing power was the power to grant
permission to an individual, corporation, or group to disobey a statute. See 6 W. HOLDS-
WORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 217 (1924); see also L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 59-
60. It has been argued that James disclaimed the suspending power and relied entirely on
the dispensing power to effect official toleration for Catholics and Nonconformists. See J.
MILLER. JAMES II: A STUDY IN KINGSHIP 157, 165 (1978). In any case, his opponents thought
he utilized both powers, made them the subject of accusations in the Declaration of Rights,
and asserted that he lacked these powers. See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 62-64. The
legality of the dispensing power was firmly established at the time of the Glorious Revolu-
tion, no matter what James' adversaries contended. See Godden v. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050
(K.B. 1686), in which Hales, a Catholic, held military office without satisfying the require-
ments of the Test Act, with which a Catholic could not comply. Godden sued Hales for the
award informers were entitled to under the Test Act. Hales defended on the ground of a
royal dispensation from the Act. Chief Justice Herbert affirmed the validity of the dispens-
ing power. The proceedings are more fully reported at 11 CoBBETr's COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEAN-
oRs 1166 (T. Howell ed. 1809-28) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS]; see also 6 W. HOLDSWORTH,
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threatened the Tory gentry and the Anglican establishment in
church and university.6 4 By exercise of his claimed royal preroga-
tive, James set aside the Test Act,65 which enabled him to place
Catholics in office, often at the expense of a removed Anglican in-
cumbent. 6 James' Declarations of Indulgence, 7 which suspended
all religious restrictions upon Catholics, were especially unpopular,
particularly with the Anglican clergy. It was the second Declara-
tion of Indulgence, however, which James commanded be read
from every pulpit, that brought revolutionary sentiment to a fer-
vor. Seven Anglican bishops refused to read the decree and pre-
pared a petition against the Indulgence that was widely distrib-
uted. The bishops were promptly charged with seditious libel,
tried, and acquitted. At the same time, James' wife gave birth to
a baby boy, which provided James with a Catholic heir to the
throne.
These two developments were particularly significant. The
bishops' acquittal was dramatic and demonstrable evidence that
public opinion was strongly against James. The birth of the heir
meant that delay was no longer affordable for James' opponents
because as long as James lacked offspring, his demise would mean
the end of Catholic rule. Accordingly, James' opponents, working
skillfully with William, issued William an invitation to invade and
restore the ancient liberties of the people. 9 William responded
with a carefully drafted declaration of his purposes, 0 in which he
disclaimed any intention to conquer. Rather, William declared that
supra, at 225.
64. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 59.
65. 25 Char. 2, ch. 2 (1673).
66. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 71-72, 79-81, 92, 250.
67. The first Declaration of Indulgence was promulgated in 1687, which dispensed
with the Test Act in order to place Catholics in positions of importance in the army, church,
universities, and government. The second such Declaration was a reissuance of the first with
the added requirement, galling to Protestants, that it be read from the pulpit by all
Anglican ministers. See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 63-64.
68. The trial proceedings are reported at 12 STATE TRIALS, supra note 63, at 183
(1688) ("Trial of the Seven Bishops").
69. The letter of invitation was dated June 30, 1688. ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS,
1660-1714, at 120 (A. Browning ed. 1953).
70. 10 H.C. JouR. 1-5 (1688). William's declaration was entitled "Declaration of His
Highness William Henry, Prince of Orange, of the Reasons Inducing Him to Appear in
Armes in the Kingdom of England for Preserving of the Protestant Religion and for Restor-
ing the Lawes and Liberties of England, Scotland, and Ireland." It was dated October 10,
1688, and quickly was followed by a postscript "Second Declaration of Reasons," dated Oc-
tober 20, 1688. Id. at 5. A third declaration, repudiated by William, appeared in November
and was "a hysterical attack on the Papists." See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 119.
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he was merely bringing an armed force "sufficient" to protect him-
self from the "violence" of James' "evil counselors." William as-
serted that he desired only a freely elected Parliament, that he
would concur with its determinations, and intended "nothing...
[but the] preservation of the Protestant religion, the covering of all
men from persecution for their consciences, and the securing to the
whole nation the free enjoyment of their laws, rights and liberties,
under a just and legal government. '7 1
With this statement as his vanguard, William and his troops
arrived in November 1685. James responded with a series of pam-
phlets that questioned William's motives, linked him with English
radicals, stressed his Dutch connections, and doubted his integ-
rity.72 These measures did little good, for James either lost his
nerve or took an immense, foolish gamble by fleeing the country in
early December. 3 In his flight, James dropped the Great Seal into
the Thames in an attempt to render any subsequent parliamentary
action illegal. 4 James may well have gambled that his actions
would precipitate such chaos that the people would beg him to re-
turn. If so, James misjudged William, the Whigs, and the English
people. William promptly entered London and, with the aid of
such Whigs as Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke,75 and Sir
Henry Pollexfen,76 issued a circular letter calling for the election of
a "Convention" to resolve the crisis created by James' flight.7
Over a three week period in January 1689, a parliamentary
71. 10 H.C. Joua. 5 (1688).
72. See L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 120-25.
73. Id. at 126. Before fleeing the country, James disbanded the army and dissolved all
writs calling for elections of sheriffs and a new Parliament. Id.
74. Id.
75. Herbert was 33 at the time of the Revolution. He was not a politician; he was a
scientific intellectual who was President of the Royal Society in 1689. He was a friend of
both Isaac Newton and John Locke. Professor Schwoerer credits him with introducing the
convention idea. Id. at 135.
76. Pollexfen was a 57-year-old prominent Whig lawyer. He was a cousin of Sir George
Treby but lacked Treby's prior experience in Parliament. He was regarded by his peers as
among the finest lawyers in England. Pollexfen had defended a number of Whigs and Whig
interests in proceedings brought by Charles II and James II, including defense of the Seven
Bishops in 1688, but also had been a crown prosecutor in Lord Jeffrey's Bloody Assizes.
Pollexfen was acutely aware of the illegal nature of the convention and sought to effect a
swift and conservative resolution to the crisis. Despite his surly nature, Pollexfen was influ-
ential with his colleagues and probably was responsible for the conservative tack taken by
the convention. Id. at 55.
77. Id. at 133-37. The circular letter, dated December 29, 1688, is reprinted at 10 H.C.
JouR. 7-8 (1688). It was directed to the county coroners instead of the sheriffs because
James had successfully replaced the Anglican sheriffs with Catholics.
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convention was elected by elections genuinely contested between
Tory and Whig candidates and generally free from royal interven-
tion.78 Strictly speaking, the convention was an illegal and revolu-
tionary body,79 but, given the circumstances, there were few who
cared to assert the point. Tory candidates proposed three options
for resolving the crisis: restoring James to the throne with condi-
tions placed upon his powers, creating a regency, or making Mary
queen in her own right.80 Whigs argued for both a change in the
king and the kingship."' The result was a modest Whig victory: out
of a 513 member convention, 174 were Whigs from prior parlia-
ments, 156 were former Tory members of Parliament, and the re-
maining 183 were "new" members lacking confirmed loyalties to
either faction.2 The convention thus was not a radical body
predisposed to wholesale surgery on the English crown. Rather, as
a whole, it was a moderately conservative group that convened on
January 22, 168983 in the noisy, "long, narrow, high-ceilinged St.
Stephen's Chapel' 8 4 to frame a conclusion to the crisis.
By the end of its first week, Commons had appointed a com-
mittee of thirty-nine members, chaired by Sir George Treby,85
charged with the responsibility of drafting the "heads of things
that were absolutely essential to secure the nation's religion, laws
and liberties."88 Four days later, on February 2, Treby's committee
78. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 138-42.
79. The elections had not been lawfully called by the crown but had been summoned
on the people's own authority. The convention's lawyers were acutely aware of its illegal
status. Id. at 55, 283. Even so, the convention justified its work by relying on contract theo-
ries of government, primarily the variation known as "philosophical contractarianism,"
rooted in natural right theories. Id. at 159-62. John Locke is, of course, most readily identi-
fied with this school of thought. Locke's Two Treatises of Government was first published
in November 1689, after the Declaration was adopted but before Parliament had enacted it
into law as the Bill of Rights. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 275. It is highly likely that
Locke influenced John Somers and other members of the convention. See infra note 90.
80. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 144.
81. Id. at 141-53, 168.
82. Id. at 152.
83. Id. at 171.
84. Id. at 172. This was the regular meeting place for the House of Commons; in other
respects the convention did not differ from a regular Parliament. Hereafter, the elected
members of the convention are sometimes referred to as the House of Commons. The House
of Lords was not an elected body and thus continued without interruption.
85. Treby was a 46-year-old veteran member of Parliament, radical Whig, Recorder of
London, and ardent opponent of the Stuarts. Educated at Oxford and the Middle Temple,
he had been a lawyer since 1671. Treby was handsome, graceful, gregarious, and a confident
and skilled speaker who delighted his colleagues with his adept mimickry of James. Most
importantly, Treby was a knowledgeable parliamentarian and an able lawyer. Id. at 43-46.
86. Id. at 30.
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presented the convention with a draft "Heads of Grievances '87
containing twenty-three "absolutely essential" articles. Five more
were added by the entire House of Commons in a brief, low-keyed
debate that contrasted markedly with the public tension and ex-
citement outside.88 Two days later, however, Treby's committee
was instructed to divide the grievances into two categories, one re-
stating ancient law and the other consisting of rights that could
only be secured effectively by new legislation.8 9 Treby did so and
reported back to the full House on February 7. On the same date a
second committee, chaired by John Somers,90 was appointed to
amend the motion sent to the House of Commons by the House of
Lords, declaring William and Mary to be king and queen of Eng-
land."' Upon Somers' request, the House of Commons agreed to
link together the draft declaration of rights and the offer of the
crown.9 2 After much intricate bargaining and politicking, Lords
and Commons approved the final Declaration and read the docu-
ment to William and Mary. The Declaration consisted of thirteen
accusations against James and a recitation of thirteen claimed "an-
tient rights and Liberties," followed by an offer of the throne.93
The implication of this linkage was inescapable: acceptance of the
throne meant acceptance of the Declaration and acquiescence to
the rights it claimed.
In reducing the "Heads of Grievances" from twenty-eight to
thirteen, the convention dropped every claimed right that was
thought by Treby's committee to require new legislation.' This
does not mean, however, that the Declaration was, in fact, an ex-
clusive recitation of truly established rights. Articles eight through
thirteen of the final version were designated by Treby's group as
both declaratory of old law and requiring new law. For this Arti-
cle's purposes, article ten is of especial interest, for it provides
"[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required nor excessive fines
87. Id. app. 2, at 299.
88. Id. at 208-09. One man was arrested for threatening to kill William, another for
distributing radical tracts urging replacement of the monarchy with a commonwealth. The
public had to be cleared from the chambers to make room for the Members of Parliament.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Somers was 38, a radical Whig educated at Oxford and the Middle Temple, and
was known to his convention colleagues as a man of "erudition and legal knowledge." He
likely was influenced by John Locke, who became a close friend following the Revolution.
Id. at 47.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 30-31.
93. Id. app. 1, at 295-98.
94. Id. at 24, 230.
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."95 As Pro-
fessor Lois Schwoerer has pointed out, articles eight through thir-
teen use the conditional verb "ought," which implies an ambiva-
lence about the ancient and established nature of the claimed
rights.96 Both Treby's designation and the use of an ambivalent
verb may be explained by concluding, as Professor Schwoerer does,
that the prohibition of excessive bail went beyond existing law,
while the prohibitions of excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishments were declaratory of existing law.17 Yet, to describe
freedom from excessive fines as "indisputably an ancient right of
the subject"98 is to engage in a technical overstatement. More
properly, the ancient right restated by the excessive fines clause of
the Declaration was the right to be free of excessive financial pun-
ishment; freedom from excessive fines-especially criminal
fines-was of much more recent vintage.
Notions of prohibiting excessive fines originated in general
prohibitions of punishments beyond specified maximum limits.
Ancient Hebrew law, assertedly of divine origin, explicitly de-
manded an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.9 Whether regarded
now as retribution or limitation, the hoary commands of Old Tes-
tament law imposed an equality between offense and punish-
ment.100 It is for that reason that this ancient law has been de-
scribed as the lex talionis.1' 0
The principle of proportionality between offense and punish-
ment was not peculiar to Hebrew civilization. Ancient Greeks, such
as Aristotle, expressed a similar concern that justice consisted of
rendering equal the offense and the consequences of the action.102
These notions arrived in England at an early date. According to
one commentator:
95. Id. app. 1, at 297.
96. Id. at 22, 87. But see F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 61 (1985).
97. See id. at 87-94.
98. Id. at 90.
99. Exodus 21:23-25 (King James).
100. Leviticus 24:19-20 (King James) provides: "And if a man cause a blemish in his
neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again." (emphasis
in original).
101. Granucci, supra note 12, at 844. "Talion" is French, derived from the Latin
"talio," for "punishment that exacts a penalty just like the crime; retaliation, as the princi-
ple of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTION-
ARY, UNABRIDGED 1860 (2d ed. 1977).
102. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 379-
81 (W. Ross ed. 1952).
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A similar concept of equality is found in the laws of the Angles and the Sax-
ons of pre-Norman England. The penal laws in the Germanic peoples of the
Middle Ages were enforced through a system of fixed penalties, and the
Norse Vikings followed such a system by listing each known crime and its
appropriate penalty in the Gulathing and Frustathing Laws. The penalties
ranged from outlawry to fines of a few ora.
10 3
The Saxon system was codified in such great detail that almost
every conceivable injury or offense carried with it a corresponding
financial punishment.104
With the Norman conquest, the lex talionis passed from the
English legal landscape. The lex talionis was replaced by the
amercement, a financial penalty assessed at the discretion of the
party's peers for a wide variety of illegal conduct, both civil and
criminal. 0 5 The amercement was assessed most commonly as a
civil sanction for wrongfully bringing or defending a civil
lawsuit.106
Because the amercement was discretionary, it was subject to
abuse. The rigidity of the Saxon system had stunted the develop-
ment of mercy or mitigation but had the virtue of preventing
wildly excessive penalties (in the sense of being beyond the legally
established norms). While the amercement permitted the penalty
assessed to vary according to its peculiar, individual circumstances,
the danger existed that the amercement could be used to impose
vindictive and excessive punishments. To curb these abuses, an en-
tire body of medieval law emerged that predated the Magna
Charta10 7 By the time of the Great Charter in 1215, the problem of
103. Granucci, supra note 12, at 844 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 845. See also the decrees of King Aethelbert 1-90, and of King Alfred 1-77,
in THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 5-17, 63-93 (F. Attenborough ed. & trans.
1922), which are so detailed as to include the price for loss of a toenail. Id. at 15.
105. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 513-22 (2d ed. 1898); see also Beecher's Case, 8 Co. 58, 77 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ex.
1609) (in which a variety of conduct for which amercement is proper is catalogued); 2
BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 330-33 (S. Thorne trans. 1968); infra note
107.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 147-63.
107. Lord Coke believed that the Magna Charta's protections against excessive
amercements were "made in the affirmance of the common law." 2 E. COKE, supra note 62,
at *27-28. Glanvill, writing in the late twelfth century, before the Magna Charta, supports
this assertion by his adumbration of the Magna Charta: "Amercement by the lord king here
means that he is to be amerced by the oath of lawful men of the neighbourhood, but so as
not to lose any property necessary to maintain his position." THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 114 (G. Hall ed. &
trans. 1965) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. Bracton, writing in the mid-thirteenth century, after
the Magna Charta, restates the principles of Chapter 14 of the Magna Charta as if they were
long established at common law. 2 BRACTON, supra note 105, at 329-30. Bracton provides a
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excessive amercements was so widespread that an entire chapter of
the Magna Charta was devoted to curbing amercements. 10 8 Subse-
quent statutes further refined and extended the Magna Charta's
guarantees.0 9 Thus, English law from a very early date contained
protections against excessive financial punishments imposed by ju-
ries but did not expressly contain similar prohibitions against ex-
cessive financial punishments imposed by judges." 0
To understand fully the convention's use of the phrase "exces-
sive fines" in article ten of the Declaration of Rights, it is neces-
sary to appreciate the medieval distinctions between amercements
and fines. An amercement was a financial penalty payable to the
crown or its representative, the feudal lord,"" assessed for some
voluminous listing of conduct meriting amercement that may be categorized as follows:
petty official corruption, economic wrongs (e.g., usury, establishing or altering a market
without a license), crimes (e.g., burglary, forgery), noncorrupt official error (e.g., action with-
out jurisdiction, wrongful or excessive levy, wrongful refusal of bail), civil misconduct (e.g.,
"wreck of the sea," poaching), and sanctions in civil litigation (e.g., default, failure to ap-
pear). Id. at 330-33. Bracton's exhaustive catalogue demonstrates both that amercements
were very well established and that they applied to practically every form of conduct.
108. Chapter 14 of the Magna Charta was devoted exclusively to protection against
excessive amercements. Chapter 14 provided that a free man shall not be amerced for a
small wrong (delicto), but according to the manner of the wrong, and for a great wrong
according to the magnitude of the wrong. Exempted from any amercement was that which
was necessary for one's support and maintenance. Although the Magna Charta provided
that earls and barons were not to be amerced except by their peers (per pares), Coke read
this as extending to all persons, whether nobility or not. 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *27-29.
Chapter 14 of the Magna Charts originally was numbered Chapter 20; with its reissuance by
Henry III in 1225, it became Chapter 14. See 2 BRACrON, supra note 105, at 330 nn.5-6.
109. The first Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw., ch. 6 (1275), cured a number of per-
ceived faults in the Magna Charta. It extended the Magna Charta's guarantees to political
and corporate bodies, removed the free men limitation (freeholders) by extending the guar-
antees to all men, made certain there could be no amercement without cause, confirmed that
no amercement could be assessed save by one's peers, and retained the property exemptions.
See 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *169-70. The Statute of Marlebridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 18
(1267), limited the courts in which an amercement could be imposed. See 2 E. COKE, supra,
at *136.
110. Coke is explicit in his conclusion that the Magna Charta's protections extend
only to amercements and not fines. 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *27; see also infra text
accompanying note 124. But see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *372-73, in which
Blackstone asserts that "[tihe reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually
regulated by the determination of magna carta, concerning amercements for misbehaviour
in matters of civil right." (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). Id. at *372. The differ-
ence may be attributable to the fact that Blackstone wrote after the Declaration of Rights
and Coke predated the Declaration. This explanation strongly suggests that article 10 of the
Declaration did operate, to legal scholars at least, as a reaffirmation of ancient restrictions
on amercements and as an explicit imposition of those same limits on criminal fines.
111. Coke notes that "amerciaments belong to the king." 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at
*29. Yet, contemporary cases report the payment of amercements to feudal lords. See Gries-
ley's Case, 8 Co. 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (C.P. 1588). Professors Pollock and Maitland assert
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misdeed-either civil or criminal-and was enforceable by an ac-
tion in debt or detinue. 112 A fine, by contrast, was a voluntary of-
fering made to the king to avoid royal displeasure or obtain some
favor.11 3 As the fine gradually lost its voluntary character, the
amercement fell out of use. Imposition of costs and punitive dam-
ages began to replace amercements as a civil sanction, particularly
with respect to civil litigation. 14 In addition, criminal fines re-
placed the amercement's penal function. This division by no means
was complete in 1689, however, and cannot safely be relied upon as
a basis for concluding that the convention was interested exclu-
sively in curbing criminal fines.
In the early seventeenth century, the constitutional and politi-
cal struggles between Parliament and the crown manifested them-
selves in a distortion of the law pertaining to amercements and
fines.11 5 Amercements could not be assessed solely by the court but
could only be imposed by a jury. Assessing fines, which lost their
voluntary character of medieval times, however, became entirely a
judicial function. Accordingly, the Stuart kings seized upon this ju-
dicial prerogative as a device to deal with their enemies. The Court
of Star Chamber imposed heavy fines, a fact that eventually led to
the Star Chamber's dissolution." 6 Indeed, when the Star Chamber
was abolished in 1641, courts were specifically forbidden from fol-
lowing its practices-including the levying of excessive fines." 7
Nevertheless, Charles II's judges ignored the limitations and im-
posed "ruinous fines" on the King's critics.1 8 The fines imposed by
Charles' judges were so severe that the House of Commons ap-
pointed a committee in December 1680 to examine judicial pro-
ceedings. 19 The committee reported that the judges had acted "ar-
that the recipient of the amercement was determined by the court in which the amercement
was imposed. Amercements imposed in royal courts went to the king, those imposed in
county courts went to the sheriff, and those imposed in seignorial courts went to the lord of
the manor. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 513.
112. F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT Nisi PRIUS 167
(2d ed. 1775); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 63, at 425.
113. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING
JOHN 293 (2d rev. ed. 1914).
114. See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 63, at 536-37; see also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 62, at *399; infra notes 177-210 and accompanying text.
115. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 91.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id,
119. Id. at 90.
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bitrarily, illegally, and partially" in imposing fines. 120 The House of
Commons then debated a bill to provide relief against fines im-
posed "not according to their crimes, but their principles: some-
times because they have been Protestants.''1 l During the final
years of Charles II's reign, the situation deteriorated further. In
1682 the Whig sheriff of London was fined 100,000 pounds, an as-
tronomical sum, for speaking ill of James, then Duke of York.122
Others, who were fined such enormous sums that they could not
pay, were imprisoned and thus ruined financially.' 23 Further insult
was added by judicial rulings that the Magna Charta provided no
protection against fines imposed for offenses against the king. 24
Although such abuses undoubtedly concerned the authors of
the Declaration of Rights, they left no indication that this was
their only concern. By assigning article ten to both categories-a
right declaratory of old law and one requiring new law-the au-
thors clearly indicated a desire to restate old guarantees as well as
claim new specific entitlements to prevent the reoccurrence of Stu-
art abuses. Moreover, article ten was significantly altered from its
first formulation as the nineteenth grievance in the Heads of
Grievances. The original expression of the grievance was as follows:
"The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal
cases, and imposing excessive fines and illegal punishments to be
prevented."' 25 By eliminating the reference to criminal cases, the
convention must have intended to make the grievance applicable
to all cases.126 This revision probably was not accidental. Solid ma-
120. 9 H.C. JouR. 692 (1680).
121. 8 A. GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR
1694, at 227-28 (1769), cited in L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 91.
122. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 91.
123. Id.
124. John Hampden's Case, in 9 STATE TRIALS, supra note 63, at 1125 (1684). The
rejection of the Magna Charta's applicability to fines was crassly instrumental, as there was
a well established common-law tradition invalidating excessive fines. Richard Godfrey's
Case, 11 Co. 42, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199 (1615), declared that "the reasonableness of the fine shall
be adjudged by the justices; and if it appears to them to be excessive, it is against law, and
shall not bind." Id. at 44, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1202.
125. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, app. 3, at 300 (emphasis added).
126. It is possible that the change was made because Treby's committee could not
envision the use of bail in anything other than a criminal proceeding, in which case the
language removed was mere surplusage. That conclusion is an unlikely one, however, be-
cause bail or its close cousin, mainprize, commonly were used in civil proceedings at the
time. See, e.g., J. COWEL, A LAW DICTIONARY OR THE INTERPRETER OF WORDS AND TERMS n.p.
(1727) (defining the terms "bail" and "mainprize"); 4 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *178-79; 1
A. FITz-HERBERT, NEW NATURA BREVIUM *251 (9th ed. 1794) (Fitz-Herbert wrote his work
during the reign of Henry VIII). Their use in civil proceedings was closely linked to the
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jorities of both Treby's and Somers' committees were able, accom-
plished lawyers; they were especially sensitive to the needs of their
profession.127 Since article ten fell into both categories, by reason
of its aggressive position with respect to prohibiting excessive
bail,12s Treby's committee was, in all likelihood, anxious to ensure
both that the "new law" portion be as encompassing as possible in
order to frustrate any new and ingenious royal devices of judicial
oppression, and that the declaratory portion be an accurate sum-
mation of ancient rights. Elimination of the reference to criminal
proceedings achieved both aims. To the extent bail might be im-
posed in civil proceedings, it could not be excessive. 12 9 Since an-
various writs of capias. Capias ad satisfaciendum was a writ of execution following a civil
judgment delivered to the sheriff requiring that the sheriff seize and imprison the debtor
until payment of the judgment was made. See J. COWEL, supra (defining the term "capias
ad satisfaciendum"). Capias ad respondendium was a similar writ issued before judgment
when a writ of distress (functionally similar to a modern prejudgment attachment) was re-
turned unsatisfied. See J. COWEL, supra (defining the terms "capias" and "distress"). Bail or
mainprize was available to the unfortunate upon whom capias was levied; sureties were re-
quired who could (and would) be amerced if the defendant failed to pay or appear at trial.
See W. RASTALL, LES TERMES DE LA REY, OR, CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND
TERMS OF THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAWS OF ENGLAND 284 (1812). This first American
edition was a reprint of the last London edition of 1721. Rastall wrote his first edition dur-
ing Mary's reign, 1553-58. While these procedural aspects of avoiding debtors' prison were
not the burning issues before Treby's committee, they undoubtedly understood and appreci-
ated their existence and significance. Accordingly, it is far more likely that the elimination
of the grievance's restriction to criminal cases was a deliberate effort to make the Declara-
tion truly declaratory of ancient law.
127. L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 35-38, 227.
128. Id. at 86-90. Professor Schwoerer contends that ancient English regulations upon
bail had never developed to the point that the crown was obligated to recognize bail or to
impose bail in reasonable amounts. Id. at 88. The Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 15
(1275), was the first statutory regulation of bail; it did not bind the king but consisted of
guidelines for sheriffs and other local officers. By 1689 bail law had not materially
progressed. Lord Coke devoted considerable effort to an itemization of those persons "baila-
ble" and those not "bailable." 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *187-91.
129. Imposition of bail in civil proceedings may not be as exotic as it seems. A modern
analogue is the reasonably common requirement that a party post a security bond in order
to proceed with an action or appeal. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977 & Supp.
1987) (requiring a shareholder derivative plaintiff to post security for costs as a precondition
for continued maintenance of suit). The concept of civil arrest for failure to pay a civil
judgment is functionally similar to bail: the judgment becomes the bail amount, which if not
posted, will result in loss of personal liberty. Moreover, civil arrest may be had for a variety
of other reasons, and bail is applicable to a civil arrest. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3106 (1975). While civil arrest has largely passed from the scene, it survives in some juris-
dictions. See, e.g., id. (stating that "[a] writ of capias ad respondendum is served by arrest-
ing the defendant, but he shall be discharged upon giving sufficient bail"). But see CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 501 (West 1979) (a person "may not be imprisoned in a civil action for debt or
tort, whether before or after judgment"). Civil arrest statutes have survived constitutional
attack. See Non-Resident Taxpayers Ass'n of Pa. & N.J. v. Murray, 347 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), afl'd, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
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cient prohibitions against excessive amercements-the precursor to
seventeenth-century fines-applied to both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, and since similar prohibitions against excessive fines were
ingrained in the case law,130 it was important for accuracy's sake
that article ten not be limited to criminal cases. 131
Moreover, at the time the convention drafted article ten, legal
prohibitions against the imposition of excessive criminal fines and
similar judicial penalties were of very recent vintage. The abolition
of the Star Chamber and the attendant legal restrictions on crimi-
nal fines occurred less than fifty years prior to the convention and
could hardly be called an ancient right. Although the Stuart kings
elected to use judicially imposed fines, rather than amercements,
as their instruments of political punishment, the astute lawyers of
Treby's committee must have known that fines were similar to
amercements and that ancient restrictions on abusive or excessive
amercements arguably did not apply to fines. It was thus especially
important to curb excessive fines and of little practical significance
to recite in explicit detail the long-established protections with re-
spect to amercements. Article ten explicitly addressed the issue of
fines, while it implicitly reaffirmed ancient rights with respect to
amercements. The Declaration of Rights' excessive fines clause
thus should be read as simultaneously prohibiting excessive fines
and amercements, whether imposed by judge or jury, in both civil
and criminal proceedings.
130. See, e.g., Richard Godfrey's Case, 11 Co. 42, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199 (1615); see also
supra note 124.
131. Justice Powell placed a different interpretation upon these events:
Although the reference to "criminal cases" was eliminated from the final draft [of the
Declaration of Rights], the preservation of a similar reference in the preamble indicates
that the deletion was without substantive significance. Thus, Blackstone treated each
of the provision's three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal proceedings and
judgments.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Justice Powell's views
may be criticized on two grounds. First, the recitation in the Declaration's statement of
grievances (or preamble) that "excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in
criminal cases," proves only that James' judges were thought to violate ancient liberties
particularly in criminal bail proceedings. The similar grievance concerning excessive fines is
not similarly confined to criminal cases. Of more importance is the fact that the grievances
were designed to specify the particular abuses of James II; the declarations of rights were
designed to reaffirm ancient liberties, whether or not James had infringed them. It is thus a
highly suspect conclusion that "the deletion was without substantive significance." More-
over, Justice Powell's reading of Blackstone is erroneous. In addressing excessive* fines,
Blackstone expressly relates the Declaration's guarantee to the Magna Charta's limitation
upon excessive amercements. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *372-73. Although Black-
stone applied the Declaration's excessive bail clause to criminal bail proceedings, he never
asserted that the provision was confined strictly to criminal cases.
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B. A Summary of the Ancient Law Restated By the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Declaration of Rights
Given the claim of ancient authority contained within the
Declaration of Rights, its later interpretation as "only declaratory,
throughout, of the old constitutional law of the land,' 13 2 and the
general American agreement with this understanding,' 3 it is im-
portant to undertake a thorough examination of the roots and de-
velopment of this "old constitutional law" that is embodied in the
excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. The inquiry begins
in Saxon law, progresses to amercements with the advent of Nor-
man law, considers the long and tangled connections between the
law of amercements and the law of fines, and ends with the demise
of amercements. As amercements fell into disuse, imposition of
fines, civil sanctions, costs, and punitive damages began to serve
functions previously performed by the use of amercements.
Saxon law did not distinguish between crime and tort. 3 4 In-
stead, it created an elaborate system of tariffs to compensate tort
and crime victims. The payments were classified generally into
wer, bote, and wite.1 5 Wer represented the monetary value Saxon
law placed on a man's life, which varied with his rank and impor-
tance.136 Wite was the term employed for payments made to the
king or other public authority.'3 " Bote signified compensation gen-
erally.138 These classifications worked together to form a unified
132. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *372. Other commentators of the period held
similar views. See, e.g., T. SOMERVILLE, HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS AND OF PARTIES
FROM THE RESTORATION OF KING CHARLES II TO THE DEATH OF KING WILLIAM (1792), cited in
L. SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 5 n.6. This view was accepted by such esteemed historians
as Macaulay. See 2 T. MACAULAY, supra note 62, at 583-85, 588-94. Macaulay was emphatic
that the Declaration "made nothing law which had not been law before." Id. at 594. Profes-
sor Schwoerer's pathbreaking contribution is her demonstration that the Declaration was
intended to be both declaratory of the old law and to assert firmly new rights. See L.
SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 281-91.
133. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that when St.
George Tucker published his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1803, his copious an-
notations and appendices relating Blackstone to American law accepted uncritically Black-
stone's characterization of the Bill of Rights as declaratory of old law.
134. See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 422-23, 425-26
(5th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 449-53.
135. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 449; 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 48.
136. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 48.
137. Id. Maitland terms wite a "penal fine." Lord Coke is far more ambivalent: "It is
to be known that wit, wita, is an old Saxon word, and signifieth an amerciament. .. " 1 E.
COKE, supra note 62, § 194, at *127.
138. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 48; 1 E. COKE, supra note 62,
§ 194, at *127 (indicating that "[bjote is also an ancient Saxon word, and sometime
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system of pecuniary settlement of both crimes and torts:
The offender could buy back the peace that he had broken. To do this he had
to settle not only with the injured person but also with the king: he must
make bot to the injured and pay a wite to the king. A complicated tariff was
elaborated. Every kind of blow or wound given to every kind of person had its
price .... 131
The Saxons employed considerable embellishments upon this
theme. They created variations, such as manbote140 or blodwite,14 1
which made the scheme both more costly and complicated. 142 In
essence, the reduction of crime and tort law to a financial schedule
created vast opportunity for cupidity. The Saxons were apparently
no more immune from the acquisitive urge than their modern
progeny: the revenue derived from the Saxon tariffs was appor-
tioned among the king, the church, the crown's favored grantees,
manorial lords, and even simple householders by a system of spe-
cialized wites and botes and related rights.143
But all of this changed with the Norman conquest. One com-
mentator observed that "this elaborate system disappear[ed] with
marvelous suddenness.' 44 Yet, what little of the Saxon system
that survived may have had a substantial impact on Norman law.
The Saxon code listed specific wites and rights of the king over
certain of his subjects, "and in Mercia he has the same over all
men." 45 This adumbration of amercement, or amerciament as
Lord Coke styled it, suggests that amercement had roots in Saxon
law and was not entirely a Norman import. 41 In any case, it was
after the Norman conquest that the notion of amercement became
fully developed.
signifieth amerciament, or compensation").
139. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 451 (footnote omitted). Wer was
the bote for homicide.
140. Manbote was the pecuniary compensation to be paid for homicide. See J. COWEL,
supra note 126 (defining the term "manbote").
141. Blodwite, according to Cowel, was both the "customary Fine paid as a Composi-
tion and Atonement, for the shedding or drawing Blood" and "an Amerciament for Blood-
shed." J. COWEL, supra note 126 (defining the term "bloodwit"). Thus, at least a century
before the Declaration of Rights, little effort was made to distinguish between amercements
and fines. But see infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text; supra note 110.
142. See, e.g., Maitland's description of the system in 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 105, at 453-58.
143. Id. at 454.
144. Id. at 458.
145. Id. at 453 (quoting Cnut, ii. 12-15). Robertson translated the statute only slightly
differently: "And in Mercia he is entitled to all the dues described above, from all men." A.
ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I 181 (1925).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
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1. Amercements
An amercement was a monetary penalty, payable to the king
or his representative, assessed for an enormous variety of miscon-
duct.147 The amercement was an all-purpose monetary sanction
used to penalize both criminal and civil wrongdoing. Individuals
and ecclesiastical and municipal corporations were all subject to
amercement. 148 In the context of civil litigation, the amercement
had a routine and well-understood application. A plaintiff in any
civil action would be amerced as a result of nonsuit, bar, adverse
verdict, or abatement of the action due to some irregularity of
pleading or procedure. 49 A defendant would be amerced if judg-
ment was rendered against him.1 50 As is true of any complex and
well-developed body of law, there were exceptions and immuni-
ties. 5 Yet, without delineating the practical aspects of civil litiga-
tion in the age of amercements, it is enough to know that the
amercement was the financial sanction most commonly assessed
upon civil litigants.
English law traditionally recognized a writ, de moderata mise-
ricordia, which afforded the subject of an amercement the oppor-
tunity to challenge the sanction as excessive. 152 There were multi-
ple bases for asserting that an amercement was excessive. For
instance, if the penalty was disproportionately large in relation to
the offense, the amercement would be considered excessive. In-
deed, this principle of proportionality was so fundamental that it
became one of the cardinal limitations upon amercements imposed
by the Magna Charta.153 If the amercement was not tainted by
147. See supra note 107.
148. 1 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *127; 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *27-29; cf. 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 566-67. For example, a municipality could be
amerced for its residents' failure to raise the "hue and cry" following commission of a crime
or for the municipality's failure to apprehend a murderer. 3 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *53;
see also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 493 (stating that an amercement against a
corporate body could be levied on all the goods of the individual members of the
community).
149. See Beecher's Case, 8 Co. 58, 77 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ex. 1609).
150. Id.
151. For example, a defendant in a praecipe quod reddat would not be amerced if he
complied with the demand of the writ on or before the return date. Id. at 61, 77 Eng. Rep.
at 566.
152. For a complete summary of the procedure under the writ to test the egregious-
ness of the amercement, see 1 A. FITZ-HERBERT, supra note 126, at 74-76.
153. Chapter 14 of Magna Charta provided:
A Freeman shall not be amerced for a small Fault [delicto], but after the Manner of
the Fault. And for a great Fault, after the Greatness thereof, saving to him his Con-
tenement. (2.) And a Merchant likewise, saving to him his Merchandize. (3.) And any
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such disproportionality, but was still so large as to infringe upon a
person's means of earning a living or maintaining himself and his
family, misericordia would still lie.154 Finally, relief was obtainable
for any jurisdictional defect in the assessment of an amercement.
For example, only certain courts could assess amercements,15 s and
only a jury could determine the amount of the amercement. 156
These numerous protections did not mean that the assessment of
amercements was rare; rather, these protections only placed sub-
stantial limitations upon the size of amercements and the process
of their imposition. Indeed, the amercement was ubiquitous: "[i]n
the thirteenth century amercements are being inflicted right and
left upon men who have done very little that is wrong.''1 s5
The doctrinal theory of amercements was that, having com-
mitted some wrong, the offender was at the mercy of the crown.
The Latin phrase of the time was that the miscreant was in miseri-
cordia.158 Accordingly, the crown theoretically was permitted to
others Villain than ours shall be likewise amerced, saving his Wainage, if he fall into
our Mercy. (4.) And none of the said Amerciaments shall be assessed, but by the Oath
of honest and lawful Men of the Vicinage. (5.) Earls and Barons shall not be amerced,
but by their Peers, after the Manner of their Offence. (6.) No Man of the Church shall
be amerced after the Quantity of his Spiritual Benefice, but after his Lay Tenement,
and after the Quantity of his Offence.
H. CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 19 (4th ed. 1719)
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter ENGLISH LIBERTIES].
154. These limitations upon the amount of an amercement, regardless of the gravity of
the offense, inhere in the Magna Charta's exceptions of "contenement," "merchandize," and
"wainage." Contenement is "that which is necessary for his Support, according to his Condi-
tion or State of Life; so that tho' he might be amerced, yet something must be left for his
Support." ENGLISH LIBERTIES, supra note 153, at 20; see also W. COCHRAN, LAW LEXICON 82
(R. Mace 4th rev. ed. 1956) ("a man's countenance or credit which he has together with, and
by reason of his freehold; (2) that which is necessary for the support and maintenance of
men, agreeably to their several qualities or states of life"). A villain was an indentured base
servant or "bond-man." His wainage was his contenement. The term originated from the
Saxon wagna, or cart, used by villains to carry dung from the Lord's manor to his fields. 2 E.
COKE, supra note 62, at *28; see also 1 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *189.
155. See 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *136 (commenting on the Statute of
Marlebridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 18 (1267), which limited the amercement power to certain
courts); cf. Richard Godfrey's Case, 11 Co. 42, 43-44, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199, 1202 (1615);
Beecher's Case, 8 Co. 58, 60, 77 Eng. Rep. 559, 565-66 (Ex. 1609); infra note 174.
156. See, e.g., Griesley's Case, 8 Co. 38, 40, 77 Eng. Rep. 530, 533-34 (Ex. 1609). The
jury was of indeterminate size, two being enough. 1 A. FITZ-HERBERT, supra note 126, at 76;
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 513. The Magna Charta formally estab-
lished what may have been a preexisting right to a jury assessment of the amercement. See
supra notes 107-08, 153. The first Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw., ch. 6 (1275), clarified the
right by making explicit that all men were entitled to a jury determination of the amerce-
ment. See 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *169-70.
157. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 513.
158. See id. The translation of the phrase is "in mercy," or at the mercy of the King.
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deal with the offender in any fashion the crown desired. In fact,
under the Saxon system of fixed wites, "there were offences which
put life and limb, lands and goods, 'in the king's mercy.' 159 The
principal advantage of the amercement over the wite, however, was
the ability to tailor the size of the amercement to the offense. It
was for this reason that the Saxon system swiftly gave way to
amercements.160 Eventually, this hoary doctrine transformed into a
new, more benign, rationale. By the seventeenth century, Lord
Coke spoke of amercement as misericordia, explaining its meaning
as that which "ought to be assessed mercifully. ' 161 Similarly, in
Beecher's Case162 the court indicated that "[a]mercement is in
Latin called misericordia; and the cause thereof is, because by the
common law (which is a law of mercy) no man ought to be amerced
so much as he deserves, but less. ' 163 Thus, at the time of the Glori-
ous Revolution, the amercement had been transformed from its
harsh Saxon origins into a flexible, discretionary tool that was well
bounded by old legal limitations.
2. Fines
The amercement and the fine had very similar functions. Be-
cause the Declaration of Rights and the eighth amendment explic-
itly deal with fines, it is important to understand the manner in
which fines developed, and the extent to which the law distin-
guished fines from amercements. Fines evolved as an alternative to
imprisonment.1 64 While statutory crimes generally resulted in im-
prisonment for a definite period," 5 common-law crimes could re-
sult in imprisonment for an indefinite period of time.16 6 This
scheme was not quite as harsh as it sounds because the judge, who
possessed the power to confine an offender indefinitely, also had
the power to discharge him after the offender paid a fine to the
king. The thirteenth-century judge could not impose a fine but
159. Id. (quoting the Domesday Book).
160. Id. at 514.
161. 1 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *126.
162. 8 Co. 58, 77 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ex. 1609).
163. Id. at 60, 77 Eng. Rep. at 564.
164. Originally, imprisonment was not a punitive device but was used for detentive
purposes or to encourage some desired conduct. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
105, at 516. Gradually, the concept of punitive imprisonment appeared and, by Edward I's
reign, became commonplace. Id. at 517.
165. See, e.g., Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., chs. 9, 13, 15, 20, 29, 31 & 32 (1275),
all of which provide for imprisonment for a definite period for the specified offenses.
166. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 517.
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could bargain with the culprit by accepting payment, or security
for payment, of a sum sufficient to settle the matter. Thus, the
offender had made an end (finem facere) of the matter. "In theory
the fine is a bilateral transaction, a bargain; it is not 'imposed,' it is
'made.' "e167 Maitland argued that a judge could not impose a fine
because to do so would violate or evade the Magna Charta, since
"an amercement should be affeered [assessed], not by royal jus-
tices, but by neighbours of the wrong-doer.' 1 68 Maitland thus im-
plicitly acknowledges the functional indistinguishability of the fine
and amercement1'e
By the seventeenth century the fine had lost its original char-
acter of bargain and was formally separated from the amerce-
ment. °7 0 Yet, in practice, as Griesley's Case'7 1 illustrates, the dis-
tinctions were much less clear. According to custom, a manorial
court had chosen Kingston to serve as constable. Kingston refused
and was "fined" five pounds for his refusal. Baily, the bailiff of
Griesley, the lord of the manor, then distrained Kingston's cattle.
Kingston brought an action in replevin to recover his cattle, and
the validity of the "fine" was offered as a defense. To rebut the
point, Kingston contended that the Magna Charta required that
the fine be "affeered," or assessed, by a jury of his peers. The court
denied the replevin, and upheld the validity of the fine, but the
manner in which it did so suggests that the court accepted King-
ston's argument that the Magna Charta applied with equal force to
167. Id. In this sense the fine is very similar to another old meaning given the term.
Conveyancing was done by fine, meaning that once the bargain was struck and the convey-
ance made, there was an end, an irrevocable finish, to the matter. Finis sums up the con-
cept. To Cowel, Fine "Hath divers Applications in the Common Law, sometimes being used
for a formal or ceremonious Conveyance of Lands or Tenements ... sometimes an Amends,
pecuniary Punishment or Recompence upon an Offence committed against the King and his
Laws, or against the Lord of a Manor." J. COWEL, supra note 126; see also 1 E. COKE, supra
note 62, at *126; 1 A. FITZ-HERBERT, supra note 126, at 97, 109, 146-47; W. RASTALL, supra
note 126, at 225-26.
168. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 517.
169. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
170. Lord Coke described the fine as "a pecuniary punishment for an offence, or a
contempt committed against the King .... And it is called finis, because it is an end for
that offense." 1 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *126. He then explained its manner of differing
from an amercement. Id. Similar distinctions were observed in the reported cases of the
time. Beecher's Case, 8 Co. 58, 77 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ex. 1609), provides voluminous examples
of conduct meriting fine or amercement. A deceit on the court, for example, was fineable,
but deceit of a party was only amerceable. Sometimes the distinctions were purely jurisdic-
tional. Since only courts of record could levy fines, if a fineable matter was pursued in a
court not of record only an amercement could be levied. Id.
171. 8 Co. 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (Ex. 1609).
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fines and amercements. The court drew a distinction "between
amerciaments in actions real or personal... or upon a presentment
or indictment, as for not repairing a bridge, or a highway.' 17 Only
one's peers could assess amercement for the former conduct, but
"the Justices or Judges of the Court where the Cause depends"
could assess "amercements of any who hath administration of jus-
tice, or of any officer or minister who hath execution of the King's
Writs.' ' 7 3 Because Kingston's misconduct consisted of his contu-
macious refusal to serve as constable, his offense was seen to be in
the administration of justice, and therefore, the court-imposed
amercement or fine was thus proper.
Griesley's Case depicts both the confusion concerning the no-
menclature (Kingston was "fined," but the court's analysis was en-
tirely in terms of amercement) as well as the conceptual differ-
ences between fines and amercements. '7  By rejecting the
applicability of the Magna Charta to amercements for official mis-
conduct, the court in Griesley's Case laid a solid footing for legal
developments vastly more troubling to the convention committee-
men who crafted the Declaration of Rights.
By the Glorious Revolution, James II's judges had determined
that the Magna Charta afforded no protection whatsoever from
fines, whether imposed for official misconduct or otherwise. 7 5
Thus, the political turmoil of the entire seventeenth century re-
sulted in a wrenching exaggeration of the unfettered power of
judges to impose financial penalties. The exceptions to the Magna
Charta, so assiduously explained in Griesley's Case, had, following
John Hampden's Case,'76 essentially swallowed the Great Char-
172. Id. at 40, 77 Eng. Rep. at 533-34.
173. Id. at 40, 77 Eng. Rep. at 534.
174. Richard Godfrey's Case, 11 Co. 42, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199 (1615), provides further
contemporaneous illustration of the conceptual confusion. Godfrey contested the validity of
a fine, and, in discussing the issues raised, the court relied almost exclusively on the law of
amercements. In resolving the validity of a court-imposed fine by reference to amercement
principles, the court underscored the functional similarity of the processes. Moreover, the
court acknowledged that fines were limited by principles almost identical to those applicable
to amercements: "[T]he reasonableness of the fine shall be adjudged by the justices; and if it
appears to them to be excessive, it is against law, and shall not bind." Id. at 44, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 1202.
The court further illustrated the doctrinal confusion by admitting that jurisdictional
limitations made the whole business of fines, amercements, and imprisonment a crazy quilt:
"Some [courts] may imprison and not fine. . . [some] may imprison but not fine.. . . Some
Courts can neither imprison, fine, nor amerce.... And some Courts may fine, imprison,
and amerce .. " Id. at 43-44, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1202.
175. See John Hampden's Case, 9 STATE TRiALs, supra note 63, at 1125 (1684).
176. Id.
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ter's limiting principles. It was this unwelcome flexing of royal au-
thority that undoubtedly was the immediate political target of ar-
ticle ten of the Declaration of Rights. The convention's lawyers,
familiar with this legal history, sought to observe and restore limi-
tations on financial penalties imposed during the judicial process,
whether by juries via amercements or by judges via fines. Thus,
while fines and amercements have separate historical antecedents,
they share common functions and, in the tinderbox of seventeenth-
century England, were inevitably linked as the legal system was
engulfed in the political struggles of the century.
3. The Displacement of Amercements By Costs, Fines, Punitive
Damages, and Judicial Sanctions
The amercement fell into disuse during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. As the amercement became obsolete, a vari-
ety of other devices assumed its functions. For instance, the fine
replaced the amercement as a means by which to punish crimes. In
addition, several devices replaced the amercement in its more com-
plex function as an all-purpose financial sanction in civil litigation.
The practice of awarding costs to the prevailing party had long
been a fixture of chancery jurisdiction, 1 7 although the practice was
only slowly woven into the fabric of the common law. While Black-
stone asserted that "the common law did not professedly allow any
[costs], [leaving] the amercement of the vanquished party [as] his
only punishment,' ' 7 8 this was not strictly true. Plaintiffs occasion-
ally recovered, under the rubric of damages, compensation suffi-
cient to "cover the costs of litigation as well as all other harm that
he had sustained.' ' 79 Recovery of costs was more difficult for de-
fendants because statutory authority was a necessary prerequisite
to such recovery. 80 Such statutes were rare,""1 and it was not until
a series of statutes ending in Queen Anne's reign 182 that defend-
ants could recover "the same costs as the plaintiff would have had,
177. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 63, at 536.
178. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *399.
179. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 597 (footnote omitted); see also
2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *288.
180. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 597.
181. The first such statute was the Statute of Marlebridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 6 (1267),
discussed at 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *109-12. Maitland thought such statutes were
"novelties." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 597.
182. The enactments include 23 Hen. 8, ch. 15 (1532); 4 Jac., ch. 3 (1607); 8 & 9 Will.
8, ch. 11 (1702); and 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 16 (1707).
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in case he had recovered." 183 Although presumably the amerce-
ment was thought to be sufficient punishment of the losing litigant,
''a payment to the king or lord was not much satisfaction to the
successful party; and so, side by side with the amercement, we get
the gradual growth of the rule that the vanquished party must pay
costs."18 In 1765 Blackstone wrote that "the amercement is dis-
used, but the form still continues."' 85 Thus, the practice of award-
ing costs to a successful civil litigant was linked by time and func-
tion with the disappearance of the amercement.
A similar linkage is evident in the development of punitive
damages. At a time when amercements were well established, an
action seeking recovery of even compensatory damages was virtu-
ally unknown. 186 Although during the twelfth century the notion of
recovering damages was embryonic,187 a century later several stat-
utes were enacted that broadened considerably the circumstances
in which damages could be obtained in an action to recover land.'88
Even without statutory authority, however, common-law judges be-
gan to permit compensatory damages in proceedings upon more
prosaic writs.189
With the acceptance of compensatory damages as a legitimate
remedy, English legislators began to experiment with the engraft-
ing of a penal function onto the law of damages. "[U]nder Edward
I, a favourite device of [English] legislators [was] that of giving
double or treble damages to 'the party grieved.' ,19o Thus, in the
first Statute of Westminster' 9 ' double and treble damages were
dispensed liberally. But penal damages appeared to be entirely a
statutory matter; no mention was made of any common-law mech-
anism to punish a civil litigant by forcing him to pay his adversary
183. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *399.
184. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 63, at 536.
185. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *376.
186. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 523.
187. The idea apparently began with the assize of novel disseisin, in which the dispos-
sessed freeholder was permitted to obtain recovery of his tenements and money to compen-
sate him for the dispossession. See GLANVILL, supra note 107, at 170 (noting that "the party
who has proved disseisin can require that the sheriff be ordered to see that the chattels and
fruits ... are restored to him").
188. The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw., ch. 1 (1278), was a general expansion of the
power to award damages in novel disseisin. See 2 E. COKE, supra note 62, at *284-90. Previ-
ous statutes had permitted more narrow expansions. See Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3, ch. 1
(1235) (dowagers, a favored class, given the right to recover damages); Statute of
Marlebridge, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 16 (1267).
189. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 105, at 524.
190. Id. at 522.
191. 3 Edw. (1275).
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a financial penalty. Thus, in the heyday of the amercement, penal
damages were in their infancy, limited to instances of statutory
largesse.
It was only after the prevalence of the amercement had dimin-
ished that the cases began to report the award of punitive damages
as a common-law entitlement. Wilkes v. Wood, 192 decided in 1763,
provides a vivid illustration of this development. Because the case
was inextricably entwined with the charged political situation of
George III's early years on the throne, a background sketch is nec-
essary. When George III became king in 1760, the Seven Years'
War was four years old, and public discontent with the King's min-
isters was growing. By 1763, when the peace treaty with France
was concluded, discontent with Grenville and Bute, two of
George's key ministers, became vocal. Particularly pointed was the
April 23, 1763, edition of The North Briton, which styled George's
ministers as tools of despotism and corruption. The edition also
hinted unsubtly that the peace treaty was "dishonestly negotiated,
and that the King was a party to it."'1 93 Predictably, George was
sufficiently unhappy with the charges that his ministers promptly
issued a general warrant for the arrest of those responsible. Since
the identities of those individuals were unknown, a general warrant
was employed to search numerous homes in hopes of finding some-
thing incriminating. In accordance with the warrant English au-
thorities searched the home of Wilkes, a member of Parliament
and noisy critic of George's ministers. Wilkes was promptly con-
victed of seditious libel,' but he refused to let matters rest. In-
stead, Wilkes brought an action in trespass against Wood, one of
the King's ministers who entered and searched Wilkes' home.
Wilkes contended that the general warrant was unlawful and
sought punitive damages.' 95 Wood's counsel, the Solicitor General,
responded that "[t]his was the first time he ever knew a private
action represented as the cause of all the good people of Eng-
land."'196 But in charging the jury, the Lord Chief Justice was
unequivocal:
Notwithstanding what Mr. Solicitor-General has said, I have formerly deliv-
192. Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
193. W. CHURCHILL, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 165 (1957).
194. For a discussion of the English law of seditious libel, see Mayton, Seditious Libel
and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
195. Wilkes' counsel asked that the jury's "resentment against such proceedings ...
be expressed by large and exemplary damages." Wilkes, Lofft. at 3, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
196. Id. at 8, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493.
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ered it as my opinion on another occasion, and I still continue of the same
mind, that a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the
injury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the in-
jured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any
such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to
the action itself.1 7
After receiving this instruction, the jury had little difficulty award-
ing Wilkes 1000 pounds, approximately twice Wilkes' claimed ac-
tual damages and a very considerable sum. Wilkes' political
travails continued, but the principle of punitive damages in a com-
mon-law civil action was firmly established.19
Common-law punitive damages emerged at a time when the
amercement existed in form only and enjoyed no use in practice. If
amercements were still a viable part of the common law in 1763,
the amercement could have been effectively employed to punish
Woods. Perhaps because Woods was an agent of the crown, and
the wrongdoing the court sought to punish was really state excess,
the amercement was quite inappropriate. In any case, the jury
charge indicates that this was not the first instance in which a civil
litigant recovered punitive damages or, as the Chief Justice stated,
"damages for more than the injury received."'199 Moreover, the
function of amercements, namely to sanction those guilty of of-
fenses not criminal but worthy of punishment, is clearly replicated
in the awarding of punitive damages. Although the link is not
drawn by the participants in Wilkes, the functional connection is
evident.
Statutory punitive damages evolved during the period when
amercements were prevalent,200 a condition that casts some doubt
on a claim that punitive damages are derived purely from amerce-
ments. Yet, there is a gap of 500 years between the first Statute of
Westminster, when statutory entitlements to punitive damages be-
came more generalized, and the award of punitive damages as a
common-law entitlement without the imprimatur of legislative ac-
tion.20 1 If punitive damages in common-law civil actions were an
outgrowth of Edward I's statutory scheme, it would seem likely
that a pattern of continued extension of the right to punitive dam-
ages would manifest itself over the intervening five centuries. But
197. Id. at 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
198. For a discussion of the Wilkes affair, see W. CHURCHILL, supra note 193, at 165-
69.
199. Wilkes, Lofft. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
201. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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that does not seem to be the case. Instead, punitive damages sud-
denly reasserted themselves in the mid-eighteenth century. Several
events may help to explain this curiosity. First, and most impor-
tant, is the restructuring of royal authority and private rights ac-
complished by the Glorious Revolution. Claiming only to restate
old law, the convention instead broadened private claims against
state authority. This, in turn, undoubtedly accelerated the demise
of the amercement, since it was a particularly obvious tool of royal
authority. But because the functions performed by the amerce-
ment had become so ingrained in the English legal tradition, these
functions were certain to be performed by other mechanisms. The
eighteenth century became the point in time when these develop-
ments coalesced. The expansion of private rights, coupled with the
functional necessity of punishing civil miscreants, created the logi-
cal opportunity for punitive damages to slip comfortably into the
common-law system.
The argument that judicial sanctions are similarly related to
amercements is more functional because it is harder to observe an
eighteenth-century development of the practice at the time the
amercement was dying. More a phenomenon of modern times, ju-
dicial sanctions are a reaction to abuses and incompetence as the
litigation process and machinery has mushroomed. Nevertheless,
amercements commonly were employed to deal with conduct
thought to be contumacious of the judicial process. Thus, civil liti-
gants were regularly amerced for improper essoin, 2 failure to ad-
mit facts later proven, °3 failure to respond to writs or other forms
of process, 204 and other procedural deficiencies resulting from a lit-
igant's error.20 5 In addition to litigants, other participants in the
judicial process were also subject to amercement; jurors, officers of
the court, and those charged with the administration of justice
were all candidates for amercement. °6 Moreover, persons responsi-
202. An essoin was an extension of time for defendants to appear and plead their
cases. It was granted for a number of reasons; for example, sickness or absence from the
jurisdiction due to service in the crown's military. See J. COWEL, supra note 126 (defining
the term "essoin"). Glanvill deals at length with the various grounds for essoin. GLANVILL,
supra note 107, at 5-20; see also Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich., 10
Edw. 2, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 SELDEN SOCIETY 3 (1934) (granting relief for an
excessive amercement resulting from an improper essoin).
203. Beecher's Case, 8 Co. 58, 60, 77 Eng. Rep. 559, 564 (Ex. 1609).
204. Id. at 61, 77 Eng. Rep. at 566.
205. Id.
206. Griesley's Case, 8 Co. 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (Ex. 1609); Vaughan's Case, 5 Co. 49,
77 Eng. Rep. 128 (1598).
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ble for the administration of justice were not entitled to the benefit
of jury assessment of the amercement. 07 This aspect of amerce-
ment procedure closely resembles judicially imposed sanctions on
attorneys. 0 8
Of course, amercements were payable to the crown; sanctions
more often are awarded to an adversary party.20 9 In that respect,
the evolution from amercements to sanctions is similar to the de-
velopment of punitive damages. In both instances, the source of
the claim against the culpable litigant or attorney has shifted from
the state to a private party: the adversary. The state remains as
the agent through which the financial penalty is assessed, and the
penalties themselves are justified in terms of their believed fur-
therance of some desirable public policy. Thus, the most striking
pattern is the privatization of the amercement. What started as an
unflinching assertion of state power has become a blend of public
purpose, state power, and private benefit. Perceiving desirable pol-
icies, the state permits private parties to seek financial penalties,
which are thought to alter private behavior to conform with this
public policy, and enforces the private benefits so obtained. Func-
tionally, little has changed. From the standpoint of the party
amerced, it does not matter whether the funds go to the state or a
private adversary. Of course, if the state receives the proceeds of
the penalties, at least the miscreant would reap some minuscule
benefit by augmenting the public fisc. In addition, because the
penalty is imposed in order to advance some public purpose, it
seems inconsistent that a private party should reap the financial
windfall inherent in any form of noncompensatory recovery. 210
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS PRIVATE FINES
The accepted justification for permitting recovery of punitive
damages is that the practice operates to deter egregiously culpable
behavior. In other words, intentionally bad actors, or those will-
fully heedless of others' welfare, ought to be punished financially
207. See Griesley's Case, 8 Co. 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (Ex. 1609).
208. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 37(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1982). Courts also
possess inherent power to impose financial sanctions. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752 (1980).
209. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1982) (providing that "[a]ny attorney .
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 37(b).
210. See infra text accompanying note 214.
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in order to deter those who might otherwise be inclined to emulate
them. Whatever the merits of this deterrence argument, it offers
absolutely no justification for the private recovery of these finan-
cial punishments, nor does it address the issue of legal limitations
upon the size of such punishments.
Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the de-
fendant for his acts, and not to redress some injury done to the
plaintiff, it is anamolous to permit private recovery of the punish-
ment. The theoretical justification for the punishment suggests
that punitive damages ought to be paid to the state and not a pri-
vate party. Justice William Rehnquist advanced that exact theory
in his dissent in Smith v. Wade."' This theory garners additional
support from the observation in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 21 2 that
punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries. '213 The
courts give jurors wide discretion to assess such fines, so long as
jurors determine the existence of the requisite culpable conduct
and the ultimate award is in some way reasonably related to the
injury or the culpable conduct.21 4 This rule is, in one way, linked to
old practices concerning amercements. While the size of an
amercement was within jury discretion, limited by the Magna
Charta and the review available under the misericordia writ, the
amercement was expressly intended only to punish wrongful con-
duct. Indeed, amercements could be and were assessed in the ab-
sence of any private injury as they were linked solely to the hei-
nousness of the offense. Translated into modern practice, the
analogous rule would be that the size of punitive damages relates
only to the culpability of the defendant's behavior and not the ex-
tent of the private plaintiff's injury. But in cases of purely financial
injury, the heinousness of the defendant's behavior is measured
principally by the extent of the plaintiff's injury. For example, is a
penalty of 3.5 million dollars excessive if an insurer wrongfully and
knowingly denies a single 1500 dollar claim? 215 If the same insurer
211. 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
213. Id. at 350. At least one state has adopted this principle. Georgia requires that
75% of punitive damages imposed in product liability actions be paid directly to the state.
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002.1(e)(1), (2) (Supp. 1987).
214. In Gertz Justice Powell observed: "[J]ury discretion over the amounts [of puni-
tive damages] awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Conse-
quently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no neces-
sary relation to the actual harm caused." 418 U.S. at 350. Excessive, in this context, is a
state common-law term of elastic dimensions.
215. Similar facts were presented in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct.
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adopts a knowing practice of deliberately denying valid claims of
1500 dollars or less, on the theory that it is economically advanta-
geous for it to do so, might a 3.5 million dollar penalty be moder-
ate? If so, the difference must surely lie in the widespread, and
aggregately larger, financial injury created by the latter practice.
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the size of pu-
nitive damages is subject to constitutional limitations by means of
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. In addition to
the historical origins of the excessive fines clause, other factors ex-
ist to support this assumption. For instance, employment of the
governmentally created judicial apparatus is sufficient involvement
of the government to counter any argument that the excessive fines
clause does not apply to punitive damages because the government
is not imposing the fine.2 16 Moreover, in an historical context, the
gradual privatization of the amercement, from royal sanction to
private civil fine, firmly supports this conclusion.217 Thus, from a
functional and historical perspective, the preferable conclusion
seems to be that punitive damages, costs, and judicial sanctions are
all financial penalties contemplated by the excessive fines clause.
In order to apply to state court judgments, however, the exces-
sive fines clause must be incorporated into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In this regard, the Supreme Court
1580 (1986). The Court avoided the excessive fines question and remanded the action to the
Alabama Supreme Court on other grounds. The issue of whether the excessive fines clause
limits the imposition of punitive damages is again before the Supreme Court. See Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct.
1367 (1987). A petition for certiorari was dismissed in another case raising this issue. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 56 U.S.L.W. 3226, No. 87-40 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1987). Another ap-
peal posing the issue was carried over into the October 1987 term. See Mobile Dodge, Inc. v.
Alford, 55 U.S.L.W. 309, No. 86-107 (U.S. Aug. 12, 1986) (appeal filed July 24, 1986); 56
U.S.L.W. 3025, No. 86-107 (U.S. July 28, 1987).
216. In a different context, at least four Justices (and possibly more) were willing to
opine that a "creditor's invocation of a State's postjudgment collection procedures consti-
tutes action under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1530 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). The imposition and
collection of punitive damages by state machinery seems even more integrally connected
with state action.
217. When Blackstone wrote his Commentaries, the amercement was dead in practice,
but observed in form. See supra note 185. Punitive damages, however, had not then ac-
quired a comfortable, and recognized, niche in the common law. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 190-99. Writing squarely in the middle of this cusp, Blackstone described numer-
ous instances in which a successful private civil suit for damages would also obligate the
private defendant to pay a fine to the crown. In general, a civil wrong accompanied by force
and violence, such as battery or false imprisonment, would trigger an obligation to pay a fine
to the king. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *118, *138; see also id. at *179, *188, *402
(dealing with violent repossession or ouster and juror attaint).
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has held that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the
eighth amendment is so incorporated;21 8 therefore, it seems a small
enough, and a logical enough, extension to incorporate the exces-
sive fines clause into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Even if the incorporation doctrine is rejected as the vehicle for
imposing constitutional limits on state court awarded punitive
damages, there remains another, unused device to reach the same
result. It has been argued that the ninth amendment219 binds the
states and compels them to enforce substantive positive rights in
existence at the time of the Constitution's adoption.220 This alter-
native theory clearly supports a conclusion that the ninth amend-
ment implicitly imported into the Constitution the common-law
protections against excessive fines, amercements, and like financial
penalties.221 Whatever the mechanism, for any constitutional limi-
tation upon punitive damages to be meaningful, the states, as well
as the federal government, must be subject to those limits.
It can be argued that since state common law imposes limits
upon punitive damages, a constitutional rule is not necessary and
will only add to the Supreme Court's already burdened docket.
Yet, if the contextual evidence plainly suggests that the right ex-
ists, it is improper to fail to enforce it on the grounds of inconve-
nience or unimportance. To do so would be to mock the reminder
of Marbury v. Madison222 that the Court must enforce judicially
discoverable principles of the Constitution. 223
Performing the duty of enforcing constitutional principles
need not result in intolerable burdens upon the courts' dockets.
State courts are well equipped to enforce constitutional guaran-
tees 224 and are bound by the supremacy clause2 2 5 to observe and
218. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
219. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
220. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 305 (1987).
221. There is little room to quarrel over whether these common-law protections were
part of colonial law at the time of American independence. That generation of Americans
enthusiastically endorsed and adopted the English common law. See M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 4-9 (1977); see also J. GOEBEL, ANTECED-
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 229-30 (1971).
222. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
223. Id. at 166-67, 177-78.
224. Cf. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 189 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (fed-
eral rights may be vindicated in a state forum unless Congress has conferred exclusive juris-
diction upon federal courts); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (6th ed. 1847).
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enforce such rights. Thus, much of the litigation concerning the
claimed constitutional excessiveness of any given punitive damage
award is likely to remain in the state court systems. While it is
possible that an increase of certiorari petitions to the Supreme
Court may result, the Court is likely to dismiss routinely such peti-
tions. Once the litigating bar understands what is constitutionally
excessive, it is likely that futile petitions seeking certiorari will
diminish.
The harder task would be to determine, in some reasonably
certain yet principled manner, what characteristics of an award of
punitive damages, costs, or sanctions make it excessive. Excessive
costs present the easiest case. Costs usually are awarded by stat-
ute 26 and any material deviation is both statutory error and, given
its lack of authority, presumptively excessive.227 Punitive damages
present an intermediate case. An award of two to three times ac-
tual damages might be thought presumptively within the constitu-
tional limits, inasmuch as the practice of double or treble damages
has a historical pedigree.228 Though the historical practices sur-
rounding amercement suggest that larger disparities might be jus-
tified in particularly heinous circumstances,2 9 it would be essential
to define, with some particularity, the triggers for such dispropor-
tionately large awards. Perhaps such an award is constitutionally
permissible if the act in question can reasonably be determined to
have affected adversely many people not represented in the action,
or is part of a pattern or practice that affects adversely many
strangers to the litigation and is committed with a particularly
cynical intent; one calculated to injure or to place the interests of
the wrongdoer ahead of others who he knows his deliberate self-
enrichment is likely to injure. Other formulations of a rule are pos-
sible and may serve better than this tentative suggestion; but some
such rule is essential, both to dampen the desire to test every puni-
tive damages award and to clarify the kind of actions that warrant
substantial private fines.
225. "This Constitution. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
226. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1021-1036 (West Supp. 1987); FED. R. Civ. P.
54(d). But see Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Payne, Costs in Common Law
Actions in the Federal Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935).
227. The authors of the English Declaration of Rights were certain" that any fine not in
accord with law was presumptively excessive. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
229. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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In any case, the excessive fines clause ought to incorporate the
rule, stemming from the Magna Charta, that no punitive damages
award can be so large as to ruin the defendant financially.230 Appli-
cation of this ancient doctrine might have some surprising results.
A homeless person with only the proverbial clothing on his back
would escape imposition of even the most modest of financial pen-
alties.2"' And Texaco, in its epic struggle with Pennzoil, 32 would
be unable to claim that punitive damages of one billion dollars are
excessive.233 These are the extreme cases. Between them lie a wide
range of cases that likely would be resolved by a straightforward
application of a limit of double or treble damages. Such a result
would provide a reasonably certain limitation and still operate to
serve the perceived goal of deterring abusive conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
Consideration of the excessive fines clause has been clouded
by the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Litigation of the
punishments issue has skewed constitutional thinking about the
entire eighth amendment toward an undue preoccupation with the
criminal process. A fresh and critical examination of its historical
antecedents indicates that the scope of the excessive fines clause
differs from that of the punishments clause. The authors of the
eighth amendment paid scant attention to the scope of the exces-
sive fines clause but merely adopted it from the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights. The clause in the Virginia Declaration was copied
expressly from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 and was
placed in the Virginia Declaration as part of a broader effort of
revolutionary colonials to claim all the historical rights of English-
men. The Declaration of 1689 was a momentous event in English
constitutional history because it asserted new rights against the
230. See supra note 154.
231. Of course, no practicing lawyer with bills to pay will waste time attempting to
recover a significant punitive damage award from such a person, quite apart from the wis-
dom of attempting to obtain compensatory damages.
232. See generally T. PErZINGER, OIL & HONOR: THE TEXAcO-PENNZOIL WARS (1987);
see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (holding that the abstention
doctrine outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), bars federal courts from en-
joining the Texas appeals bond procedures).
233. Under this analysis, the original award of three billion dollars in punitive dam-
ages would not be considered excessive. Because Texaco has opted for bankruptcy, it might
be argued that the entire judgment is so huge that it threatens Texaco's existence. While
this may be true, it is the compensatory portion that makes the threat severe. No argument
is made here that the excessive fines clause is intended to curb compensatory damage
awards.
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crown, firmly restated old rights, and laid the foundation of mod-
ern parliamentary democracy.
One of the old rights restated in the English Declaration of
Rights was the protection against excessive fines. This right in-
cluded more than protection from criminal fines; it also provided a
great deal of protection with respect to civil fines. The Declara-
tion's authors saw no need to state explicitly the scope of these
protections because, at the time, the term "fine" was used to de-
scribe both criminal fines and the dying civil "fine" of amercement.
It is thus highly likely that the excessive fines clause, born in 1689
during the Glorious Revolution, was intended to sweep broadly
and impose limitations upon all manner of fines, civil or criminal.
Because punitive damages did not become part of the common law
until three-quarters of a century later, and then only in a tentative
fashion, colonial Americans did not perceive a need to state explic-
itly that the excessive fines clause covered private as well as public
fines. As a result, the applicability of the excessive fines clause to
punitive damages has been overlooked.
Subjecting punitive damage awards to such constitutional
scrutiny invites docket congestion and requires articulation of a
principled definition of the term "excessive." Docket congestion
will likely disappear with articulation of a clear definition that is
applied consistently. One proposed standard is to presume that
punitive damages of no more than three times actual damages are
not excessive, and to evaluate more disproportionate awards by
considering the bases upon which punitive damages are premised:
the extent of the harm caused to both the litigants and society,
and the cynicism of the wrongful action.
This Article's conclusions rely heavily upon the historical ori-
gins of the excessive fines clause, both in its original formulation in
the 1689 Declaration of Rights and in the much older legal tradi-
tions that the excessive fines clause sought to express. Yet, this
Article makes no contention that the Constitution ought to be in-
terpreted solely by reference to historical sources or context.134
While that effort weaves a useful background into the constitu-
tional tapestry, the meaning of the excessive fines clause is in-
formed as much by the functional purposes sought to be performed
by punitive damages. Excessive private fines imposed and collected
through an elaborate governmental apparatus are no less opprobri-
ous by virtue of their ostensibly private character. This combina-
234. See supra note 40.
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tion of history and function serves to illuminate the broad scope of
the excessive fines clause.
